

Dorrit Cohn
Transparent
 *Minds*

*Narrative Modes for
Presenting Consciousness
in Fiction*

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Preface

The questions that gave rise to this book arose empirically, at the point where my interest in narrative form came to meet my predilection for novels with thoughtful characters and scenes of self-communion. The need to account for analogies and variations sent me to narrative theory just long enough to contemplate what Todorov calls "the virtualities of literary discourse." Equipped with these basic abstractions I could then travel around in narrative literature, selecting works and passages in works that would best display the entire spectrum of possibilities, while in turn allowing these works themselves to reveal unforeseen hues. The result is a critical text woven of a multitude of paradigmatic quotations and close analyses, all held within a firm typological frame.

My textual repertoire rarely departs from the corpus of narrative literature most familiar to students of fictional form. A century of psychological realism—roughly 1850 to 1950—provides the majority of illustrations, with some additions from as far back as Sterne and as far forward as Sarraute. When I move sideways to less familiar ground—usually to the German domain, which I know best—it is always to point up anomalies that illuminate the norm.

Even though my approach follows typological rather than chronological lines, I have not altogether disregarded the historical dimension. The direction in which I sweep across the principal techniques generally corresponds to evolutionary changes of fictional form: from vocal to hushed authorial voices, from dissonant to consonant relations between narrators and protagonists, from maximal to minimal removes between the language of the text and the language of consciousness. On a larger scale, the fact that I begin with narrators who exclude inside views and end with interior-monologue texts that exclude narrators also suggests that my typological lines are not entirely disengaged from the historical axis.

But my study lays no claim to encompassing the entire realm of fictional form, either synchronically or diachronically. It explores a special and specific subject, to which a general poetics of fiction—including the most comprehensive and rigorous one to date, Gérard Genette's *Discours du récit*—can usually devote only a short section. Yet it is a privileged subject: not only because so much modern fiction plays within the consciousness of its characters, but also because fictional consciousness is the special preserve of narrative fiction. For this reason the devices through which it is presented are closely allied—and frequently confused—with the modes for presenting the fictional world as a whole: narrative situation or point of view.

This brings me to a final prefatory point. The problem of narrative perspective, more than any other narratological problem, has polarized literary scholarship in the last decades between the two Pascalian spirits: the proliferating *finesse* of criticism and the reductive *géométrie* of linguistics. In terms of expository idioms: to one side the urbane, metaphoric, highly readable style and thought of the critic who refuses to engage in what he regards as hairsplitting definitions and distinctions; to the other the unreadable abbreviations and formulae of the linguist who refuses to communicate with readers unwilling or unable to decipher his code. At the risk of falling between stools, I have tried for a compromise: to use (and, when necessary, to coin) a consistent, rigorous, but not recondite terminology for my subject, which I continue to use in unabbreviated form and in whole sentences, no matter how awkward or monotonous the resulting prose.

Since the most important criteria I employ for typological distinctions are basic grammatical forms (especially tense and person), I have found that significant features in quotations could be preserved in translation, provided only that I scrupulously sacrificed elegance to accuracy. For this reason the majority of translations from French and German are my own; in some cases I was able to adapt, and, in a very few cases, to adopt, existing translations. But readers who know

these languages will want to check my analyses against the original, reproduced at the bottom of the page. I would have preferred to use only works that I could read in the original myself. But the Russians were, of course, indispensable, as was one great Scandinavian (Hamsun); experts in these languages were kind enough to check and amend for me some passages from published translations. All editions from which I quote, as well as those on which I base my translations, are listed at the back of the book.

Some of my ideas were rehearsed in article form, and I wish to thank the editors of *Comparative Literature*, *PMLA*, *Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift* and *Festschrift für Käte Hamburger* for permission to expand this material and to integrate it into my larger scheme. This scheme itself was worked out during a year generously supported by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, as well as by Indiana University and Harvard University. Several friends and colleagues read my manuscript in whole or in part at various stages of composition and offered valuable critical advice: Ruby Cohn, Ann Fehn, Paul Hernadi, Jan Hokenson, Breon Mitchell. I am deeply grateful to each of them. I would also like to express my thanks to a number of persons who, in varied but essential ways, helped me to overcome moments of discouragement in the course of my work on this book: Iso Camartin, Ruby Cohn (again), Dr. James Dalsimer, Judith Kates, Frank Ryder, Maria Tatar, and my sons Steve and Rick.

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Cambridge, Massachusetts
December 1977.

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Narrated Monologue

Initial Description

In a German Naturalist story entitled *Papa Hamlet* (1889), which recounts the mental and physical decay of a Shakespearean actor, one finds the following passage:

He had of late—but wherefore he knew not—lost all his mirth, forgone all custom of exercises; and indeed it went so heavily with his disposition that this goodly frame, the earth, seemed to him a sterile promontory; this most excellent canopy, the air, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire, why it appeared no other thing to him than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours. What a piece of work was a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet, to him, what was this quintessence of dust? man delighted him not; no, nor woman neither.¹

* Er hatte seit kurzem—er wusste nicht wodurch—all seine Munterkeit eingebüsst, seine gewohnten Übungen aufgegeben, und es stand in der Tat so übel um seine Gemütslage, dass die Erde, dieser treffliche Bau, ihm nur ein kahles Vorgebirge schien. Dieser herrliche Baldachin, die Luft, dieses majestätische Dach mit goldnem Feuer ausgelegt: kam es ihm doch nicht anders vor als ein fauler, verpesteter Haufe von Dünsten. Welch ein Meisterwerk war der Mensch! Wie edel durch Vernunft! Wie unbegrenzt an Fähigkeiten! In Gestalt und Bewegung wie bedeutend und wunderwürdig im Handeln, wie ähnlich einem Engel; im Begreifen, wie ähnlich einem Gotte; die Zierde der Welt! Das Vorbild der Lebendigen! Und doch: was war ihm diese Quintessenz vom Staube? Er hatte keine Lust am Manne—und am Weibe auch nicht.

taken him up by an imperceptibly mounting road? "Where are we?" asked K. in a low voice, more of himself than of Barnabas.⁵

3. Joyce's Stephen Dedalus waiting for confession:

The slide was shot to suddenly. The penitent came out. He was next. He stood up in terror and walked blindly into the box.

At last it had come. He knelt in the silent gloom and raised his eyes to the white crucifix suspended above him. *God could see that he was sorry. He would tell all his sins. His confession would be long, long. Everybody in the chapel would know then what a sinner he had been. Let them know. It was true. But God had promised to forgive him if he was sorry. He was sorry.* He clasped his hands and raised them towards the white form, praying with his darkened eyes, praying with all his trembling body, swaying his head to and fro like a lost creature, praying with whimpering lips.⁶

What the italicized portions of these passages most obviously share is that they cannot be read as standard narration. Narrative language appears in them as a kind of mask, from behind which sounds the voice of a figural mind. Each of its sentences bears the stamp of characteristic limitations and distortions: of Septimus' manic obsessions, K.'s ignorance of present and future circumstance, Stephen's self-serving religiosity. Far more than in ordinary narrative passages, their language teems with questions, exclamations, repetitions, overstatements, colloquialisms. In short, neither the content nor the style of these sentences can be plausibly attributed to their narrators. But both their content and their style become

* Da blieb Barnabas stehen. *Wo waren sie? Ging es nicht mehr weiter? Würde Barnabas K. verabschieden? Es würde ihm nicht gelingen.* K. hielt Barnabas' Arm fest, dass es fast ihn selbst schmerzte. *Oder sollte das Unglaubliche geschehen sein, und sie waren schon im Schloss oder vor seinen Toren? Aber sie waren ja, soweit K. wusste, gar nicht gestiegen. Oder hatte ihn Barnabas einen so unmerklich ansteigenden Weg geführt? "Wo sind wir?"* fragte K. leise, mehr sich als ihn. [my emphasis]

entirely plausible if we understand them as transposed thought-quotations—which is why the "translation" test (as the willing reader can verify) will "work" in each case.

But the point is, of course, that the language a "translation" yields is *not* in the text. Nor are there other indications that someone is thinking. We are told not "Stephen said to himself: 'God can see that I am sorry. I will tell all my sins,'" but simply "God could see that he was sorry. He would tell all his sins." Stephen's personal rapport with the Divinity is treated *as if* he were formulating it in his mind, but the words on the page are not identified as words running through his mind.⁷ By leaving the relationship between words and thoughts latent, the narrated monologue casts a peculiarly penumbral light on the figural consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation. This ambiguity is unquestionably one reason why so many writers prefer the less direct technique.

Another is the seamless junction between narrated monologues and their narrative context. Note how, in the Joyce passage, the text weaves in and out of Stephen's mind without perceptible transitions, fusing outer with inner reality, gestures with thoughts, facts with reflections, as report of posture and gaze—"he knelt . . . and raised his eyes"—gives way to the purely imaginary "God could see . . . God had promised," which in turn gives way to factual report—"He clasped his hands and raised them." By employing the same basic tense for the narrator's reporting language and the character's reflecting language, two normally distinct linguistic currents are made to merge.

The Kafka text alternates more rapidly, but no more perceptibly, between report and reflection: "At that moment Barnabas stopped. *Where were they?* . . . K. clutched Barnabas' arm so firmly that he almost hurt himself. *Or had the incredible happened. . . ?*" By contrast when the very same question that begins the narrated monologue—"Where were they?"—is repeated at its end—"Where are we?"—it cuts off the unified current by direct quotation. Such sudden shifts to directly

quoted discourse (silent or spoken) underline the potential-actual relationship between narrated monologue and verbal formulation, creating the impression that a mind's vague ruminations have irresistibly led to conceptual expression. We get the same pattern at the end of Septimus' narrated monologue, when an unfinished thought-sentence breaks into a quoted question: "*was to be given whole to . . .* "To whom?" he asked aloud."

The beginning of the Woolf passage illustrates a different junction between narration and narrated monologue. In another standard pattern, a sentence of psycho-narration—"Their marriage was over, he thought, with agony, with relief"—shapes the transition from the preceding report to the narrated monologue, even as it sets the tone (of agony and relief) that reigns in Septimus' thoughts. As we already noted in the villanelle passage from Joyce's *Portrait* (in Chapter 1), psycho-narration flows readily into a narrated monologue, and the latter clinches the narrator-figure cohesion that the former approximates.

We can now profile the narrated monologue more sharply by examining its linguistic relationship with its closest relatives: first with the two rival techniques for rendering consciousness, second with the narration of fictional reality generally.

The demarcation between the narrated monologue and the two other techniques for rendering consciousness is generally easy to draw. Tense and person separate it from quoted monologue, even when the latter is used in the Joycean manner, without explicit quotation or introduction; the absence of mental verbs (and the resulting grammatical independence) separates it from psycho-narration. The following schema shows how the same thought-phrase would appear in the three techniques:

quoted monologue
 (He thought:) I am late
 (He thought:) I was late

(He thought:) I will be late
narrated monologue
 He was late
 He had been late
 He would be late
psycho-narration
 He knew he was late
 He knew he had been late
 He knew he would be late

A typical narrated-monologue sentence stands grammatically *between* the two other forms, sharing with quoted monologue the expression in the principal clause, with psycho-narration the tense system and the third-person reference. When the thought is a question, the word-order of direct discourse is maintained in the narrated monologue, increasing its resemblance to quoted monologue and its distinction from psycho-narration:

quoted monologue
 (He thought:) Am I late?
narrated monologue
 Was he late?
psycho-narration
 He wondered if he was late.

Minute as these differences may appear when schematized in this fashion, they reflect in simplest grammatical terms the basic relationship between the three techniques: in its meaning and function, as in its grammar, the narrated monologue holds a mid-position between quoted monologue and psycho-narration, rendering the content of a figural mind more obliquely than the former, more directly than the latter. Imitating the language a character uses when he talks to himself, it casts that language into the grammar a narrator uses in talking about him, thus superimposing two voices that are kept distinct in the other two forms. And this equivocation in turn creates the characteristic indeterminateness of the narrated monologue's relationship to the language of conscious-

ness, suspending it between the immediacy of quotation and the mediacy of narration. Accordingly, its function fluctuates when it is found in the immediate vicinity of the other techniques: when it borders on psycho-narration, it takes on a more monologic quality and creates the impression of rendering thoughts explicitly formulated in the figural mind; when it borders on spoken or silent discourse, it takes on a more narratorial quality and creates the impression that the narrator is formulating his character's inarticulate feelings.

The problem of delimiting the narrated monologue from narration generally is far more complex, since purely linguistic criteria no longer provide reliable guidelines. Cloaked in the grammar of narration, a sentence rendering a character's opinion can look every bit like a sentence relating a fictional fact. In purely grammatical terms "He was late" (our sample sentence) could be a narrator's fact, rather than a character's thought. Within a broader context it might become possible to attribute it to a figural mind: for instance, if the next sentence belied the idea that "he was late"; or if the statement were embedded in a recognizable thought sequence. Woolf's "The rope was cut; he mounted; he was free" (in the passage quoted above) could, when taken out of context, be read as a narrator's description of a balloonist taking off for a flight. But in its context—the insane Septimus sitting on the Regent's Park bench, misinterpreting his wife's removal of her wedding ring—we understand these statements as the author means us to understand them, even before the following sentences more clearly signal monologic language. Obviously, an author who wants his reader to recognize a narrated monologue for what it is will have to plant sufficient clues for its recognition. These clues may be contextual, semantic, syntactic, or lexical, or variously combined.⁸ A narrated monologue, in other words, reveals itself even as it conceals itself, but not always without making demands on its reader's intelligence. The critic who suggested that the trial against Flaubert for *Madame Bovary* would not have taken place if the prosecutor had recognized that the "immoralities" it con-

tained were Emma's narrated monologues rather than Flaubert's authorial statements may have overstated his case.⁹ But there is no doubt that this kind of confusion is responsible for innumerable misreadings—including some in print—of works that employ the technique.

In sum, the narrated monologue is at once a more complex and a more flexible technique for rendering consciousness than the rival techniques. Both its dubious attribution of language to the figural mind, and its fusion of narratorial and figural language charge it with ambiguity, give it a quality of now-you-see-it, now-you-don't that exerts a special fascination. Even dry scholars wax poetical when they describe its effects. Here is an early German theorist's description: "It lights up with vivid hues a realm that the reporting and describing narrator deliberately tones down by keeping it at a distance from himself. And it creates this effect far more readily than a narrative containing occasional monologues, where a more perceptible contrast exists between pure report and quoted thought. Its stirring effect depends on the fact that it is barely discernible to the naked eye: the device is irresistible precisely because it is apprehended almost unconsciously."¹⁰

Theoretical and Historical Perspective

In both France and Germany—where it goes respectively by the names *style indirect libre* and *erlebte Rede*—the narrated monologue has been the subject of intensive discussions ever since it was first identified around the turn of the century.¹¹ The first students of the technique were grammarians and linguists, but—since literary scholarship in both these countries maintained a close relationship with philological studies—the phenomenon was soon discussed by such eminent literary scholars as Leo Spitzer, Oskar Walzel, and Albert Thibaudet.¹² In the fifties there was a marked revival of interest in the phenomenon in Germany, this time in the context of more theoretical discussions, as *erlebte Rede* came increasingly to be regarded as a key concept for generic definitions of

fiction, typologies of the novel, the nature of narrative language, and the development of modern narrative practices.¹³ In the recent writings of the French structural narratologists *style indirect libre* has played a less central role, perhaps because they have been more preoccupied with macro- than with micro-structures, and more with first- than with third-person forms of fiction. Still, it is a standard concept in French criticism today. Todorov, Genette, and others have variously related it to their central categories of *mode*, *aspect*, and *voix*, even if they have not yet given it the close attention it deserves in a systematic study of narrative discourse.¹⁴

An entirely different situation exists in Anglo-American criticism, where the narrated monologue has until recently been virtually ignored, and where it bears no standard name.¹⁵ This neglect is especially surprising when we consider that an English writer was the first extensive practitioner of the form (Jane Austen), and that it has been the preferred mode for rendering consciousness in the works of James, Lawrence, the early Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Thomas Wolfe et al. Even such sensitive theorists and historians of fiction as David Daiches, Ian Watt, or Scholes and Kellogg seem unaware of its existence, and Wayne Booth—though acquainted with the German term *erlebte Rede*—dismisses it as an unwonted stylistic nicety.¹⁶ Not that the phenomenon has gone entirely unnoticed in individual texts: in a number of stylistically oriented studies one finds it aptly described, but always only as an idiosyncrasy of the particular writer or text under consideration. Here are three examples from James, Joyce, and Woolf criticism: For Gordon O. Taylor the method for rendering Isabel's thoughts in Chapter 42 of *The Portrait of a Lady* "although still cast in the third-person, [is] divested of most authorial trappings," and the "third-person intrusions approximate convincingly, though they fail to reproduce exactly, the links in her own train of thought."¹⁷ William M. Schutte, citing what is clearly a narrated-monologue passage from Joyce's *Portrait*, describes it as a combination of "the unselected stream of Stephen's consciousness" and a "traditional

third person summary account."¹⁸ For David Daiches, Woolf's use of the technique in *Mrs. Dalloway* is a very special "compromise between reported thought and direct, unedited transcription of consciousness."¹⁹ The similarity in the foregoing quotations is obvious, and should of itself suggest that James', Joyce's, and Woolf's specimens belong to the same species. Is it perhaps because he has no name for the beast that each critic assigns it to the special fauna of the text he is examining? A common label for so widespread a stylistic phenomenon would, at any rate, clarify critical discourse: the heuristic value of a standard literary term is precisely to identify an individual occurrence as an instance (and variation) of a general norm.

In recent years, British and American linguists, using mostly the translated French term "free indirect style," have given mounting attention to this literary technique, with some even regarding it as the most fertile meeting ground between linguists and literary scholars.²⁰ A number of less technical essays now exist in English as well, by literary critics familiar with the German and French background.²¹ But the concept—no matter by which of its names—has yet to enter the everyday language of criticism in English.

My own term "narrated monologue" as an English equivalent for *style indirect libre* and *erlebte Rede* calls for some justification and qualification. The French and German terms have generally designated not only the rendering of silent thought in narrated form, but also the analogous rendering of spoken discourse, which displays identical linguistic features.²² I have deliberately chosen a term that excludes this analogous employment of the technique, because in a literary—rather than a strictly linguistic—perspective the narration of silent thoughts presents problems that are quite separate, and far more intricate and interesting than those presented by its more vocal twin. "Narrated discourse" involves neither the ambiguity concerning the actual - potential status of language that characterizes the narrated monologue, nor the difficulties

of recognizing it within its narrative context. It has seemed to me that so special a phenomenon deserves a separate name, a name that relates it to the other techniques for rendering consciousness, more nearly and more clearly than other, more inclusive terms.²³ For the purposes of the present study, at any rate, the overarching concern with the presentation of figural minds prompted the more restrictive term.²⁴

But the term "narrated monologue" is purposefully restrictive in yet another, more important sense: the denotative field of the French and German terms—and of their English equivalents—has, in recent years, grown far beyond the bounds of figural thought (and discourse) to include the entire realm of figural narration. Todorov has sketched its range of meanings as follows: "This term has been used to designate a family of phenomena which have common traits, but which nonetheless cannot be encompassed by a single definition. All cases of *style indirect libre* range between two limits: on the one side, a reported discourse that has the syntactic forms of indirect discourse, but that maintains certain characteristics of pragmatic speech; on the other side, a vision of reality that is not the narrator's own, but that of a fictional character, the so-called '*vision avec*,' which does not necessarily conform to precise linguistic criteria."²⁵ In its broadest meaning, then, at the second limit Todorov mentions above, *style indirect libre* becomes an alternate term for an entire mode of narration (*vision avec*—the term originally proposed by Pouillon—being roughly identical to figural narrative situation). It is this broad denotation that my more narrowly conceived term "narrated monologue" purposely excludes.²⁶ By implying the correspondence to a (potential) quoted monologue, the more specific name pinpoints a more specific "thing." And even though the line of demarcation between figural thought and its immediate context may not always be easy to draw in practice, the term "narrated monologue" suggests a method for discerning its location—or for explaining its effacement.

The terminological separation of this technique for rendering consciousness from the narrative situation with which it

has become associated seems to me important for at least three different reasons. 1. Narrated monologues can—as we shall see—also occasionally be very ironically used in authorial narrative contexts, and though its effect varies with its surroundings, its basic structure remains the same. 2. Conversely, figural narration can be used for quite different purposes than can the narration of consciousness: even Henry James and Kafka often use their protagonists merely to reflect (but not to reflect *on*) the external events they witness. Other devices then come into play, such as "narrated perception," and related techniques.²⁷ 3. Finally, the narrated monologue is by no means the only method used for rendering consciousness in a figural context: we have already seen that the consonant type of psycho-narration and the un signaled quoted monologue often supplement, and sometimes supplant, the narrated monologue form.

It is only when we have drawn this distinction between narrated monologue and figural narration that we can describe the very special relationship between them. It is one not only of part to whole, but of mutual affinity and enhancement: figural narration offers the narrated monologue its optimal habitat, and the narrated monologue caps the climax of figural narration. The first is true because the narrated monologue—in contrast to the quoted monologue—suppresses all marks of quotation that set it off from the narration, and this self-effacement can be achieved most perfectly in a milieu where the narrative presentation adheres most consistently to a figural perspective, shaping the entire fictional world as an uninterrupted *vision avec*. The narrated monologue itself, however, is not *vision avec*, but what we might call *pensée avec*: here the coincidence of perspectives is compounded by a consonance of voices, with the language of the text momentarily resonating with the language of the figural mind. In this sense one can regard the narrated monologue as the quintessence of figural narration, if not of narration itself: as the moment when the thought-thread of a character is most tightly woven into the texture of third-person narration.

Critics have called on a variety of metaphors to describe this narrator-figure coincidence: optic, acoustic, geometric, textile, erotic, and so forth. It matters little which image we use, so long as it stresses the very special two-in-one effect created by this technique, without overstressing either its dualism or its monism. To speak only of a *dual* presence (perspective, voice, etc.) seems to me misleading: for the effect of the narrated monologue is precisely to reduce to the greatest possible degree the hiatus between the narrator and the figure existing in all third-person narration.²⁸ But to speak simply of a *single* presence (perspective, voice, etc.) is even more misleading: for one then risks losing sight of the difference between third- and first-person narration; and before long the protagonists of figural novels (Stephen, K., Strether) become the "narrators" of their own stories.²⁹ In narrated monologues, as in figural narration generally, the continued employment of third-person references indicates, no matter how unobtrusively, the continued presence of a narrator. And it is his *identification*—but not his *identity*—with the character's mentality that is supremely enhanced by this technique.³⁰

If the narrated monologue is defined and understood in the manner outlined in the preceding pages, then the main stages of its historical development also becomes clear: its occasional occurrence in eighteenth-century "Histories" (of *Tom Jones* or *Agathon*), despite their over-all authorial-ironic cast; its upsurge in the nineteenth-century Realist novel, in rough correspondence with the rise of objective over obtrusive narrators, and of the inner over the outer scene; its expansion in the twentieth-century psychological novel, prompted by the unprecedented importance given to the language of consciousness, but with the narrated monologue now competing with the rival technique of the unsigned "Joycean" monologue. Its evolution thus differs considerably from that of the quoted monologue and of psycho-narration: since the narrated monologue blurs the line between narration and quotation so dear to the old-fashioned authorial narrator, it makes its ap-

pearance rather late in the history of narrative genres. Its growth is also closely tied to a specific moment of the novel's development: the moment when third-person fiction enters the domain previously reserved for first-person (epistolary or confessional) fiction, and begins to focus on the mental and emotional life of its characters.

It is not at all surprising, then, that Jane Austen should have been one of the first writers to use the narrated monologue frequently and extensively: for it is in her work—as Ian Watt suggests in the epilogue to *The Rise of the Novel*—that the "divergent directions" of Richardson and Fielding were first brought together, launching the novel on its way toward their full-fledged "reconciliation" in Henry James.³¹ In her narrated monologues Austen seems precisely to cast the spirit of epistolary fiction into the mold of third-person narration. This happens at moments of inner crisis in several of her novels, as in the following example from *Emma*:

How could she have been so deceived! He protested that he had never thought seriously of Harriet—never! . . .

The picture! How eager he had been about the picture! And the charade! And a hundred other circumstances; how clearly they had seemed to point at Harriet! To be sure, the charade, with its "ready wit"—but then, the "soft eyes"—in fact it suited neither; it was a jumble without taste or truth. Who could have seen through such thick-headed nonsense?³²

And so forth, for a few more paragraphs, with the rhythm of inner debate—no matter how rhetorical and self-conscious—exactly transposed into narrative language, without explicit quotation or authorial explication. Most Victorian novelists, notably Eliot and Meredith, continued to use narrated monologues in this fashion, without altogether banishing the authorial tone from their novels as a whole.³³

The decisive turning-point for the narrated monologue came, of course, with Flaubert. Perceptive students of his style agree that his systematic employment of the *style indirect*

libre is his most influential formal achievement. Proust said, in a famous essay, that this device "completely changes the appearance of things and beings, like a newly placed lamp, or a move into a new house."³⁴ Flaubert himself, when he comments on his "impersonal" narrative method, employs phrases that come close to pinpointing the narrated monologue itself, especially in the following passage from a letter to Georges Sand: "I expressed myself badly when I told you that 'one should not write with one's heart.' I meant to say: one should not put one's personality on stage. I believe that great Art is scientific and impersonal. One should, by an effort of the spirit, *transport oneself into the characters, not draw them to oneself*. That, at any rate, is the method." [my emphasis]³⁵ Translating this kinetic image into linguistic terms would yield an exact description of the narrated monologue—as would the theological image Flaubert used elsewhere, when he referred to his "faculté panthéiste."³⁶

After Flaubert, as Thibaudet remarks, the *style indirect libre* enters "into the common current of novelistic style, abounds in Daudet, Zola, Maupassant, everyone."³⁷ Whenever Naturalist novels focus on individual lives and on instantaneous experiences—say in Maupassant's *Une Vie*, or Zola's *Le Docteur Pascal*, or the Gervaise scenes of *L'Assommoir*—their pages teem with narrated monologues, hardly ever lapsing into directly quoted ones. Yet, in view of the Naturalists' predilection for mass scenes, wide temporal vistas, manifest behavior and dialogues, they created relatively few extended occasions for the employment of narrated monologues. Such occasions had to await the "inward turning" of the novel: those writers who believed with Henry James that "what a man thinks and what he feels are the history and the character of what he does."³⁸ In James' own theoretical pronouncements, which so persistently revolve around the axis of the narrator-protagonist relationship, we find images that come even closer than Flaubert's to describing the narrated monologue. Given James' general reticence in erotic matters, it is both amusing and significant to find him using in this connection what is

probably the most direct allusion to the sexual act in his entire oeuvre: "A beautiful infatuation this, always, I think, the intensity of the creative effort to get into the skin of the creature; the act of personal possession of one being by another at its completest."³⁹ This espousal of a character by his narrator "at its completest" is precisely what James attains in moments when he uses the narrated monologue.

The pattern set by Jane Austen thus unfolds throughout the nineteenth century: precisely those authors who, in their major works, most decisively abandoned first-person narration (Flaubert, Zola, James), instituting instead the norms of the dramatic novel, objective narration, and unobtrusive narrators, were the ones who re-introduced the subjectivity of private experience into the novel: this time not in terms of direct self-narration, but by imperceptibly integrating mental reactions into the neutral-objective report of actions, scenes, and spoken words.

When the Impressionist and Expressionist writers in Germany, and the stream-of-consciousness writers in England began to shape more slowly paced novels dominated by their characters' fluid mental responses to momentary experience, they found in the narrated monologue a ready-made technique that could easily be adapted to the new aims. Unlike the quoted monologue, it needed no Joycean revolution to make it a workable instrument for recording the minutiae of the inner life. Hence it acted as a kind of stylistic bridge that led from nineteenth- to twentieth-century fiction. Far from being a mark of modernity, the narrated monologue is a device that the novelists of our century who are most conservative in matters of form (Thomas Wolfe, Mauriac, or Lawrence) share with such experimental novelists as Virginia Woolf, Broch, Sarraute, or Robbe-Grillet. The difference lies only in the quantitative relationship of the narrated monologue to its narrative context: in *Mrs. Dalloway*, *The Death of Virgil*, *The Planetarium*, *The Voyeur*, the narrative text appears as the adjunct of the narrated monologue, rather than the other way around.

This brief historical synopsis of the technique must now be supplemented by closer study of its various functions and effects.

Irony and Sympathy

The narrated monologue, unlike the quoted monologue, does not readily shape itself into an independent fictional text, for by referring to the character whose thoughts it renders in the third person it includes the narrative voice in its language, and the monologic effect it creates vanishes the moment fictional facts reappear. As we have seen in the *Portrait* passage quoted earlier, when we read the sentence sequence: "But God had promised to forgive him if he was sorry. He was sorry. He clasped his hands and raised them towards the white form . . .," the moment Stephen's manual gesture appears, the monologic impression is dispelled. The narrated monologue is thus essentially an evanescent form, dependent on the narrative voice that mediates and surrounds it, and is therefore peculiarly dependent on tone and context.

Many novels that use the narrated monologue as the predominant technique for rendering their characters' consciousness start from a neutral and objective narrative stance—typically the description of a specific site or situation—and only gradually, often by way of minimal exposition, narrow their focus to the figural mind. The first sentence of *L'Éducation sentimentale* reads as follows: "On the 15th of September 1840, about six o'clock in the morning, the *Ville de Montereau* was ready to sail from the quai Saint-Bernard, and clouds of smoke were pouring from its funnel." From this soberly informational base, Flaubert's text then imperceptibly gravitates, within a few pages, to the emotive speculations with which Frederic reacts to Madame Arnoux's "appari-

* Le 15 septembre 1840, vers six heures du matin, *la Ville de Montereau*, près de partir, fumait à gros tourbillons devant le quai Saint-Bernard.

* Quels étaient son nom, sa demeure, sa vie, son passé? . . . Il la supposait d'origine andalouse, créole peut-être; elle avait ramené des îles cette négresse avec elle?

tion": "What was her name, her home, her life, her past? . . . He supposed her to be of Andalusian origin, perhaps a creole. Had she brought the negress back with her from the West Indies?"⁴⁰ From here on the narrator will glide in and out of Frederic's mind at will, adopting his protagonist's inner language at crucial moments, but always free to return to his objective narrative base, to describe minutely the protagonist's actions and his surroundings, or to sketch with broader strokes changes of circumstance occurring over longer periods.

But no matter how "impersonal" the tone of the text that surrounds them, narrated monologues themselves tend to commit the narrator to attitudes of sympathy or irony. Precisely because they cast the language of a subjective mind into the grammar of objective narration, they amplify emotional notes, but also throw into ironic relief all false notes struck by a figural mind. A narrator can in turn exploit both possibilities, even with the same character, and Flaubert exploits them both with Frederic, alternately stressing the pathos of his love for Madame Arnoux and the blunders of his social and professional choices. Sympathy predominates in this passage that renders Frederic's thoughts after the Arnoux bankruptcy:

And afterwards? What would become of her? Would she be a schoolmistress, a companion, or even a lady's maid? She had been abandoned to all the perils of poverty. His ignorance of her fate tormented him. He should have prevented her flight, or else followed her. Was he not her real husband?⁴¹

and irony predominates in this passage where he decides on his "future":

* Et après? que deviendrait-elle? Institutrice, dame de compagnie, femme de chambre, peut-être? Elle était livrée à tous les hasards de la misère. Cette ignorance de son sort le torturait. Il aurait dû s'opposer à sa fuite ou partir derrière elle. N'était-il pas son véritable époux?

He wondered, seriously, if he was to be a great painter, or a great poet; and he decided in favour of painting, for the demands of this profession would bring him closer to Madame Arnoux. So he had found his vocation! The aim of his existence was now clear, and the future infallible.⁴²

In the first quotation the narrator creates the impression that he is seriously identifying with Frederic's anguish; in the second he mockingly seems to identify with his inauthentic decision.

In *L'Education sentimentale* these alternating attitudes of empathy and parody are applied by the narrator to a single protagonist. But the narrated monologue also enables a narrator to weave in and out of several characters' minds. Virginia Woolf is the master-weaver of such multi-figural novels. From Clarissa to Peter, from Rezia to Septimus, from Mrs. to Mr. Ramsay, narrated monologues pass from hers to his and back again, often without intervening narrative sentences.⁴³ But in transit the tone can change, and it often does when the gender of the pronoun changes. In *To the Lighthouse* a lyric climax is reached with the narration of Mrs. Ramsay's "wedge of darkness" meditation, a parodistic climax with the narration of Mr. Ramsay's "He reached Q" rumination.⁴⁴ The fertile feminine mind and the arid masculine mind are both relayed by the same narrator's grammar, but the former's language is heightened by the transposition, the latter's is abated.

The ironic pole of this tonal range is most clearly in evidence when narrated monologues show up in a pronouncedly authorial milieu, framed by explicit commentary. Here is how the Stendhal narrator presents Fabrice's reactions to the filching of his horse by his own comrades at the Battle of Waterloo:

* Il se demanda, sérieusement, s'il serait un grand peintre ou un grand poète;—et il se décida pour la peinture, car les exigences de ce métier le rapprocheraient de Mme Arnoux. Il avait donc trouvé sa vocation! Le but de son existence était clair maintenant, et l'avenir infallible.

He could find no consolation for so great an infamy, and, leaning his back against a willow, began to shed hot tears. He abandoned one by one all those beautiful dreams of a chivalrous and sublime friendship, like that of the heroes of the *Gerusalemme Liberata*. To see death come to one was nothing, surrounded by heroic and tender hearts, by noble friends who clasp one by the hand as one yields one's dying breath! But to retain one's enthusiasm surrounded by a pack of vile scoundrels!!! Like all angry men Fabrizio exaggerated. After a quarter of an hour of this melting mood. . . .⁴⁵

A character's illusions and a narrator's worldliness, romance and realism clash head-on here, with the triple exclamation mark signaling the "exaggeration" of Fabrice's language even before it is spelled out after the fact. Framed in this fashion by markedly dissonant psycho-narration, a narrated monologue appears as though it were enclosed in tacit quotation marks, creating an effect of mock-impersonation. The metaphor of an actor playing a role, which a number of critics have applied to the narrator-character relationship created by the narrated monologue,⁴⁶ is valid here only if we expand it to include the actor schooled in Brechtian alienating techniques.

Even abrupt alienation is achieved when authorial remarks are enclosed *within* a narrated monologue. An interesting instance of this kind occurs in *The Magic Mountain*, when the amorous Hans Castorp catches himself singing a love ditty from the lowlands, turns a critical glance on its banal language, and in turn prompts his narrator to turn a critical glance on his hero's language:

This kind of sentimental ditty might very well satisfy

* Il ne pouvait se consoler de tant d'infamie, et, le dos appuyé contre un saule, il se mit à pleurer à chaudes larmes. Il défaisait un à un ses beaux rêves d'amitié chevaleresque et sublime, comme celle des héros de la *Jérusalem délivrée*. Voir arriver la mort n'était rien, entouré d'âmes héroïques et tendres, de nobles amis qui vous serrent la main au moment du dernier soupir! mais garder son enthousiasme, entouré de vils fripons!!! Fabrice exagérait comme tout homme indigné. Au bout d'un quart d'heure d'attendrissement . . .

and please some young man who had quite legitimately, peacefully, and optimistically "given his heart," as the saying goes, to some healthy little goose down there in the flatlands. . . . But for him and his relationship with Madame Chauchat—the word "relationship" must be charged to his account, we refuse to take the responsibility for it—this kind of ditty was decidedly inappropriate. . . .⁴⁷

Note that the narrator, even as he dissociates himself from his character, draws attention to the fact that it is not he, but his character, who here engenders the vocabulary of the narrative text. He is actually teaching his reader an instant lesson in narrative technique, as much as to say: don't be deceived by appearances, this passage may look like my narration, but it is really a monologue that I am narrating—verbatim.⁴⁸

Such explicitly ironic narrators play easier games with the narrated monologue than those who pretend sympathy for their characters in the surrounding text, creating what might be called mock-figural narrative situations. In Sartre's *Bildungsnovella* of a budding fascist, "L'Enfance d'un chef," the narrator adopts, from beginning to end, the point of view of Lucien, his *salot*-protagonist. Inauthenticity stands most clearly revealed not in the purely narrative sections of the work, but at those moments when Lucien's own language appears in the guise of narration. The following narrated monologue toward the end of the story tells how he discovers in anti-Semitism a long-searched-for identity and virility:

He absolutely had to find words to express this extraordinary discovery. Quietly, cautiously, he raised his hand to his forehead, like a lighted candle, then collected him-

* An solchem innigen Liedchen mochte irgendein junger Mann Genüge und Gefallen finden, der "sein Herz", wie man zu sagen pflegt, erlaubter-, friedlicher- und aussichtsreicherweise irgend einem gesunden Gänschen dort unten im Flachlande "geschenkt" hatte . . . Für ihn und sein Verhältnis zu Madame Chauchat—das Wort "Verhältnis" kommt auf seine Rechnung, wir lehnen die Verantwortung dafür ab—schickte sich ein solches Gedichtchen entschieden nicht; . . .

self, for an instant, thoughtful and sacred, and the words came of themselves, he murmured: "I HAVE RIGHTS!" Rights! Something in the nature of triangles and circles: it was so perfect that it didn't exist, no matter how many thousands of rings you traced with a compass, you could never make a single circle. In the same way generations of workers could scrupulously obey the commands of Lucien, they would never exhaust his right to command, rights were beyond existence, like mathematical objects or religious dogmas. And Lucien was precisely that: an enormous bouquet of responsibilities and rights.⁴⁹

This language creates its own distancing effects from within; exaggerations, pompously narcissistic imagery, the false analogy between mathematical, religious, and social absolutes: all build up the devastating portrait of an inauthentic man.

The first half of the "Nausicaa" section of *Ulysses* uses narrated monologues in a similar context, melted into mock-figural narration.⁵⁰ The narrator's style is at times so strongly "infected" by Gerty's own mental idiom that it is difficult to draw borderlines between narration and narrated monologue—even more difficult than in the *Ulysses* sections that quote Bloom's or Stephen's thoughts directly, since no help is offered by changing person or tense. Yet a narrator is distinctly present, and it is his burlesque of sentimental *kitsch* that molds the common denominator between his narration and Gerty's thoughts:

* Il fallait absolument trouver des mots pour exprimer son extraordinaire découverte. Il éleva doucement, précautionneusement sa main jusqu'à son front, comme un cierge allumé, puis il se recueillit un instant, pensif et sacré, et les mots vinrent d'eux-mêmes, il murmura: "J'AI DES DROITS!" Des Droits! Quelque chose dans le genre des triangles et des cercles: c'était si parfait que ça n'existait pas, on avait beau tracer des milliers de ronds avec des compas, on n'arrivait pas à réaliser un seul cercle. Des générations d'ouvriers pourraient, de même, obéir scrupuleusement aux ordres de Lucien, ils n'épuiseraient jamais son droit à commander, les droits c'était par delà l'existence, comme les objets mathématiques et les dogmes religieux. Et voilà que Lucien, justement, c'était ça: un énorme bouquet de responsabilités et de droits.

Notes

Introduction—pages 3-17

1. *Tristram Shandy*, pp. 75-76 (Book I, chap. 23).
2. E.T.A. Hoffmann, *Meister Floh*, p. 806.
3. *Remembrance of Things Past*, I, trans. Moncrieff, p. 64.
4. Truman Capote, *In Cold Blood*, pp. 243-244.
5. E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (New York, 1927/1954), p. 45.
6. "Versuch über das Theater," *Gesammelte Werke* (Frankfurt, 1960), X, p. 29.
7. José Ortega y Gasset, "Notes on the Novel," in *The Dehumanization of Art and Other Writings on Art and Culture* (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), p. 95.
8. "The Art of Fiction," in *The Future of the Novel*, ed. Leon Edel (New York, 1956), pp. 5 and 14.
9. "Preface to *The Portrait of a Lady*," in *The Art of the Novel*, ed. Richard P. Blackmur (New York, 1962), p. 45.
10. *Op. cit.*, pp. 48 and 51.
11. *Op. cit.*, p. 57.
12. Trans. Marilyn J. Rose (Bloomington, Indiana, 1973). Originally published as *Die Logik der Dichtung* (Stuttgart, 1957; 2nd revised edition, 1968).
13. *The Logic of Literature*, p. 83.
14. It is important to realize, however, that Hamburger excludes from her category of epic (narrative) fiction all forms of first-person narration. Only narration in the third person creates a mimetic reality, whereas first-person narrative forms have a structure that imitates non-fictional (mainly autobiographical) texts.
15. See Erich Kahler, *The Inward Turn of Narrative*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (Princeton, N.J., 1973). See also Richard Brinkmann, *Wirklichkeit und Illusion* (Tübingen, 1957) for a theory of Realism as progressive "subjectivization" of reality.

16. "Die Kunst des Romans," *Gesammelte Werke* (Frankfurt, 1960), X, pp. 356-357.
17. "Modern Fiction," in *The Common Reader* (New York, 1948), pp. 212-213.
18. *Versuch über den Roman* (1774; rpt. Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 264-265.
19. *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Wiesbaden, 1947), VI/2, pp. 468-469.
20. See especially Georg Lukács, "Erzählen oder Beschreiben? Zur Diskussion über Naturalismus und Formalismus" (1936), in *Begriffsbestimmung des literarischen Realismus*, ed. Richard Brinkmann (Darmstadt, 1969); Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (Garden City, N.Y., 1957), pp. 551-553; Wolfgang Kayser, *Entstehung und Krise des modernen Romans* (Stuttgart, 1954); Leon Edel, *The Modern Psychological Novel* (New York, 1955); David Daiches, *The Novel and the Modern World* (Chicago, 1960), pp. 1-11.
21. *The Dehumanization of Art*, p. 33.
22. The following are some of the most frequently quoted studies in this vein: Frederick J. Hoffman, *Freudianism and the Literary Mind* (Baton Rouge, La., 1945); Lawrence E. Bowling, "What is Stream of Consciousness Technique?", *PMLA* 65 (1950), 333-345; Robert Humphrey, *Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel* (Berkeley, 1954); Melvin Friedman, *Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method* (New Haven, 1955); Leon Edel, *The Modern Psychological Novel* (New York, 1955); Shiv K. Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel* (New York, 1963). The same imprecise approach to the technique problem also pervades the recent book by Erwin R. Steinberg, *The Stream of Consciousness and Beyond in Ulysses* (Pittsburgh, 1973).
23. Edel establishes a rough equivalence between stream of consciousness and interior monologue, and also uses the terms alternately to refer to techniques and to types of novels. See, for example: pp. 11, 18, 24, 56.

24. Humphrey distinguishes four techniques: direct interior monologue, indirect interior monologue, description by an omniscient author, and soliloquy (pp. 23-41).
25. "Modes of Interior Monologue: A Formal Definition," *Modern Language Quarterly* 28 (1967), 229-239. Bickerton establishes the following equivalences with Humphrey's categories:

soliloquy: direct speech
 omniscient description: indirect speech
 indirect interior monologue: free indirect speech
 direct interior monologue: free direct speech

(The last of these categories is Bickerton's term for direct speech that is not explicitly introduced or quoted.)

Seymour Chatman has recently proposed a similar, if more refined, fourfold correspondence to the modes of speech quotation; see "The Structure of Narrative Transmission" in *Style and Structure in Literature*, ed. Roger Fowler (Oxford, 1975), pp. 213-257, esp. pp. 248-257.

26. Gérard Genette, *Figures III* (Paris, 1972), pp. 191-193.

27. These terms are used by Bickerton (p. 254) and Bowling (p. 343). Humphrey's "description by an omniscient author" and Scholes and Kellogg's "narrative analysis" have similar disadvantages (See *The Nature of Narrative* [New York, 1966], p. 193.)

28. Humphrey, p. 33. Humphrey must be given credit, however, for acknowledging the existence of this "conventional" technique in stream of consciousness novels. Other critics have categorically denied that novels of this type include such "omniscient" passages. See Bowling, pp. 343-344, Friedman, pp. 5-6, Bickerton, p. 235.

29. See, for example, Bickerton's analysis of a passage from *Middlemarch*, pp. 235-236.

30. See Edouard Dujardin, *Le Monologue intérieur* (Paris, 1931), pp. 7 and 65-73. Also W. J. Lillyman, "The Interior Monologue in James Joyce and Otto Ludwig," *Comparative*

Literature 23 (1971), 45-54, esp. pp. 49-50; Bickerton, "Modes of Interior Monologue," pp. 233-235; and Humphrey, pp. 36-38.

31. Dujardin himself sums up the distinction like this: "The essential innovation of the interior monologue consisted in its object, which was to evoke the uninterrupted flux of thoughts that traverse the mind of the character, at the moment they arise, without explaining their logical linkage, while giving the impression of haphazardness. . . . The difference is not that the traditional monologue expresses less intimate thoughts than the interior monologue, but that it coordinates them by showing their logical linkage." (*Le Monologue intérieur*, p. 68.)

32. I have previously argued in favor of this grammatical criterion (and against the interior monologue - soliloquy distinction) in "Narrated Monologue: Definition of a Fictional Style," *Comparative Literature* 18 (1966), 97-112, p. 109. See also Scholes and Kellogg, who introduce their admirable discussion of direct thought-quotations from Homer to Joyce by clearly distinguishing interior monologue from stream of consciousness and identifying it with "unspoken soliloquy" (p. 177). W. J. Lillyman tries to refute these arguments on the grounds that the true (Joycean) interior monologue "lacks all signs of a narrator's presence, all signs of a narrator's control" (p. 47). But the only "signs" of this kind that he is able to find in pre-Joycean monologues are external to the actual thought-quotation, and concern rather the manner in which the monologue is tied into the context: whether or not it is explicitly introduced (p. 49). In this respect Joyce did of course introduce an innovative pattern that needs to be discussed.

33. Scholes and Kellogg, p. 193.

34. See "Narrated Monologue: Definition of a Fictional Style."

35. I have resisted replacing the familiar terms "first-person" and "third-person" by the corresponding Genettean terms "homodiegetic" and "heterodiegetic." Genette is en-

tirely correct in pointing out that the traditional terms are inexact because "all narrative is, by definition, virtually in the first person." (*Figures III*, p. 252.) But the unfamiliarity of Genette's terms is a heavy price to pay for the small gain in precision. Caution in using the approximate older terms seemed to me preferable for the purposes of this study.

36. Genette, for example, does not take differences of person (voice) sufficiently into account in his discussion of focalization (point of view) in *Figures III*, pp. 203-211. See the critique by Shlomith Rimmon: "A Comprehensive Theory of Narrative: Genette's *Figures III* and the Structuralist Study of Fiction," *PTL* 1 (1976), 33-62, pp. 58-59.

37. David Goldknopf, *The Life of the Novel* (Chicago, 1972), pp. 38-39.

38. This distinction has been disregarded in the studies (referred to above) by Dujardin, Bowling, Humphrey, Friedman, Edel, Bickerton, Scholes and Kellogg, Lillyman. It also remains unmentioned by Valéry Larbaud in his preface to *Les Lauriers sont coupés*. Only Genette views the distinction correctly and suggests that texts of the *Les Lauriers* type "which one has rather unfortunately baptized the 'monologue intérieur' should more properly be called *discours immédiat*" (*Figures III*, p. 193).

39. Cited in English by Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce* (New York, 1959), p. 534. Ellmann translates Joyce's comment from its French quotation by Valéry Larbaud in the preface to the 1925 edition of *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, which reads as follows: "Dans *Les Lauriers sont coupés*, me dit Joyce, le lecteur se trouve installé, dès les premières lignes, dans la pensée du personnage principal, et c'est le déroulement ininterrompu de cette pensée qui, se substituant complètement à la forme usuelle du récit, nous apprend ce que fait ce personnage et ce qui lui arrive."

40. It is therefore highly misleading to take Joyce's description of *Les Lauriers* as his "definition of interior monologue" generally, as W. J. Lillyman does in his article "The Interior Monologue," p. 50.

41. According to Ellmann, "Penelope" was completed in October, 1921, and the comment to Larbaud was made in November, 1921. (*James Joyce*, pp. 533-534.)

42. There is no evidence Joyce himself used the term interior monologue. But in the "Linati Schema," he shows his awareness of the difference between "Penelope" and sections like "Proteus" by calling the "Technic" of the former "Monologue," that of the latter "Soliloquy." See Richard Ellmann, *Ulysses on the Liffey* (New York, 1972), Appendix.

Some critics have applied the term interior monologue exclusively to interior-monologue novels, notably Michel Butor in "L'usage des pronoms personnels dans le roman" (*Répertoire II* [Paris, 1964], pp. 61-72), and Erika Höhnisch, *Das gefangene Ich: Studien zum inneren Monolog im französischen Roman* (Heidelberg, 1967).

1 Psycho-narration—pages 21-57

1. *Vanity Fair*, p. 50 (chap. 4).

2. The distinction between "contextual" and "intrinsic" knowledge of characters is drawn in W. J. Harvey, *Character and the Novel* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1965), p. 32. Though Harvey acknowledges the importance of both kinds of characterization in fiction, his book deals solely with "contextual" knowledge.

3. *The Rise of the Novel* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 268-280.

4. *Tom Jones*, p. 527 (Book XI, chap. 8) and p. 158 (Book IV, chap. 14).

5. *Tom Jones*, p. 270 (Book VII, chap. 2).

6. *Vanity Fair*, p. 360 (chap. 31).

7. *Le Père Goriot*, p. 891.

8. Henry James hints at this seesawing relationship when he argues—in the preface to *The Princess Casamassima*—for protagonists with rich and subtle minds, but concedes that Tom Jones can get away with his mindlessness because "his author—he handsomely possessed of a mind—has such an amplitude of reflection for him and round him that we see

him through the mellow air of Fielding's fine old moralism, fine old humour and fine old style. . ." (*The Art of the Novel* [New York, 1962], p. 68).

9. Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago, 1961), p. 164.

10. The terms "dissonant" and "consonant" I apply to these two types of psycho-narration are my own. But the typological contrast they define corresponds to the two typical narrative situations Franz Stanzel defines for third-person narration, which he names "authorial" and "figural" (in German *auktorial* and *personal*; see *Narrative Situations in the Novel: Tom Jones, Moby Dick, The Ambassadors, Ulysses*, trans. J. P. Pusack [Bloomington, Indiana, 1971], pp. 23-25, 27-29, and chaps. 2 and 4). I will use both pairs of terms in conjunction throughout this study, with the term "dissonant" applying specifically to the relationship between the narrator and the protagonist in an authorial narrative situation, the term "consonant" to the narrator-protagonist relationship in a figural narrative situation.

Both the authorial-figural and the dissonant-consonant pairs correspond approximately to a whole series of polarities proposed by other critics: *vision par derrière - vision avec* (Pouillon, Todorov), telling—showing (Booth), non-focalized—focalized (Genette) etc. For a recent correlation of French, German and American approaches to the problem of narrative perspective, see Françoise Van Rossum-Guyon, "Point de vue ou perspective narrative: Théories et concepts critiques," *Poétique I* (1970), 476-497.

11. *Der Tod in Venedig*, pp. 493-494.

12. Sartre's well-known polemic against Mauriac centers on this point. Though we may readily agree with him that Mauriac explains the inner life of his characters in an irritatingly patronizing manner, Sartre throws out the baby with the bath-water when he bans all psycho-narration from the novel: "the introduction of absolute truth or of God's standpoint constitutes a double error in technique" (François Mauriac and Freedom," in *Literary and Philosophical Essays*,

trans. Annette Michelson [London, 1955], p. 15). For Booth's disagreement with Sartre, see *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, pp. 50-53. Booth's own views are most explicitly stated in the chapter "The Uses of Reliable Commentary."

13. *The Ironic German: A Study of Thomas Mann* (Boston, 1958), p. 99.

14. Cf. William M. Schutte's *Introduction to Twentieth Century Interpretations of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), p. 12. Schutte counts nineteen such phases or "presents," and explains: "As the action moves from present to present . . . the style subtly modulates to reflect the inevitable changes in the quality of Stephen's apprehension of the world about him." See also in the same volume, F. Parvin Sharpless, "Irony in Joyce's Portrait: The Stasis of Pity," p. 97.

15. *A Portrait of the Artist*, pp. 175-176.

16. For this reason Wayne Booth's "Problem of Distance in *A Portrait of the Artist*" (*The Rhetoric of Fiction*, pp. 323-336) seems to me more his problem than that of Joyce's text. When he charges Joyce with "confusion of distance," all he is really saying is that Stephen is a complex literary creation who gives rise to contradictory interpretations. This is equally true of Don Quixote, Hamlet, Alceste, Faust, Anna Karenina, and Kafka's K.

17. Cf. Robert Scholes' different, though not necessarily contradictory, view that the text preceding the stanzas of the villanelle is "an elaborate explication" of the poem by the author ("Stephen Dedalus, Poet or Aesthete," *PMLA* 89 [1964], 484-489).

18. *A Portrait of the Artist*, p. 217.

19. "Sprachmischung als Stilmittel und als Ausdruck der Klangphantasie," in *Stilstudien II* (1922, rpt. Munich, 1961), pp. 84-124, esp. p. 98.

20. As Derek Bickerton has shown, there are very few direct thought-quotations in the *Portrait* ("James Joyce and the Development of Interior Monologue," *Essays in Criticism* 18 [1968], 32-46, pp. 40-41). The villanelle must, however, be added to the three other instances he mentions.

'Steady Monologuy of the Interiors,' " *Review of English Literature* 6:2 (1965), 32-41. Grammatical incompleteness is discussed on pp. 37-39.

91. Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, ed. and trans. E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).

92. Vygotsky, p. 135.

93. *Op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

94. *Loc. cit.*

95. *Op. cit.*, p. 127.

96. *Ulysses*, pp. 57 and 377.

97. *Ulysses*, pp. 55, 57, 370.

98. Vygotsky, p. 145.

99. *Op. cit.*, p. 147.

100. This is a term used by Humphrey (p. 70).

101. Cf. Steinberg, *The Stream of Consciousness*, pp. 107 and 159.

3 Narrated Monologue—pages 99-140

1. Arno Holz and Johannes Schlaf, *Papa Hamlet* (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 28. Ruby Cohn has drawn attention to this transposition of Hamlet's speech into narrated monologue form in *Modern Shakespeare Offshoots* (Princeton, N.J., 1976), p. 153.

2. This Hamlet speech is not, of course, strictly speaking, a monologue, since he speaks it in the presence of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. But for my present purposes this fact is not revelant.

3. Cf. Roland Barthes' suggestion that certain passages in third-person texts can be "rewritten" (he uses the Frenchified verb "rewriter") in the first person ("Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits," *Communications* 8 [1966], 1-27, p. 20). See also Richard Ohmann's application of the "transformation" concept to a Hemingway text containing narrated monologue ("Generative Grammars and the Concept of Literary Style," *Word* 20 [1964], 423-439).

4. *Mrs. Dalloway*, pp. 101-102.

48. In "Erlebte und verschleierte Rede," Norbert Miller points out that this tongue-in-cheek variety has a much longer history than the serious narrated monologue form—a change that corresponds to the general evolution of the novel from the authorial to the figural pole. Modern ironists like Mann and Musil, however, revert to the older form with particular gusto. See Werner Hoffmeister, *Studien zur erlebten Rede bei Thomas Mann und Robert Musil* (The Hague, 1965), pp. 110-127).

49. "L'Enfance d'un chef," p. 220.

50. Robert Humphrey seems to be the only critic to have identified correctly the basic technique of the Gerty-half of "Nausicaa" (*Stream of Consciousness*, pp. 30-31).

51. *Ulysses*, p. 357.

52. *Der Prozess*, pp. 271-272; English based on *The Trial*, trans. Muir/Butler, pp. 254-255.

53. Cf. chap. 1, where I discuss the entirely different technique Broch uses when his protagonists are benighted "sleepwalkers," unconscious of their own mental processes.

54. "Bemerkungen zum *Tod des Vergil*," *Essays I* (Zurich, 1955), p. 265.

55. *Der Tod des Vergil*, p. 9; English: *The Death of Virgil*, trans. Untermeyer, pp. 11-12.

56. *Der Tod des Vergil*, pp. 13-14; *The Death of Virgil*, p. 15. (I have altered the tense of two verb-forms to make the translation correspond to the original; see n. 57 below.)

57. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, the passages that employ the present tense in the original were translated into the English past tense. This change, as the "Translator's Note" explains, was deliberate (*The Death of Virgil*, p. 488). Though it was made on rather doubtful linguistic grounds, the fact that it was made with Broch's approval is definite proof that he envisioned the present-tense passages as monologic, rather than authorial, language. But the ambiguity created by the present tense in the original gets lost in the English—though it is, in all other respects, a masterful translation.