DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation

The Time of the Nation

The title of this chapter — DissemiNation — owes something to the wit and wisdom of Jacques Derrida, but something more to my own experience of migration. I have lived that moment of the scattering of the people that in other times and other places, in the nations of others, becomes a time of gathering. Gatherings of exiles and émigrés and refugees; gathering on the edge of ‘foreign’ cultures; gathering at the frontiers; gatherings in the ghettos or café of city centres; gathering in the half-life, half-light of foreign tongues, or in the uncanny fluency of another’s language; gathering the signs of approval and acceptance, degrees, discourses, disciplines; gathering the memories of underdevelopment, of other worlds lived retroactively; gathering the past in a ritual of revival; gathering the present. Also the gathering of people in the diaspora: indentured, migrant, interned; the gathering of incriminatory statistics, educational performance, legal status, immigration status — the genealogy of that lonely figure that John Berger named the seventh man. The gathering of clouds from which the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish asks ‘where should the birds fly after the last sky’?

In the midst of these lonely gatherings of the scattered people, their myths and fantasies and experiences, there emerges a historical fact of singular importance. More deliberately than any other general historian, Eric Hobsbawm writes the history of the modern Western nation from the perspective of the nation’s margin and the migrants’ exile. The emergence of the later phase of the modern nation, from the mid-nineteenth century, is also one of the most sustained periods of mass migration within the West, and colonial expansion in the East. The nation fills the void left in the uprooting of communities and kin, and turns that loss into the language of metaphor. Metaphor, as the etymology of the word suggests, transfers the meaning of home and belonging, across the ‘middle passage’, or the central European steppes, across those distances, and cultural differences, that span the imagined community of the nation-people.

The discourse of nationalism is not my main concern. In some ways it is the historical certainty and settled nature of that term against which I am attempting to write of the Western nation as an obscure and ubiquitous form of living the locality of culture. This locality is more around temporality than about historicity: a form of living that is more complex than ‘community’, more symbolic than ‘society’, more communitarian than ‘country’; less patriotic than patrie; more rhetorical than the reason of State; more mythological than ideology; less homogeneous than hegemony; less centred than the citizen; more collective than the ‘subject’, more psychic than civility; more hybrid in the articulation of cultural differences and identifications than can be represented in any hierarchical or binary structuring of social antagonism.

In proposing this cultural construction of nationness as a form of social and sexual affiliation, I do not wish to deny these categories their specific histories and particular meanings within different political languages. What I am attempting to formulate in this chapter are the complex strategies of cultural identification and discursive address that function in the name of ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ and make them the immanent...
subjects of a range of social and literary narratives. My emphasis on the temporal dimension in the inscription of these political entities—that are also potent symbolic and affective sources of cultural identity—serves to displace the historicism that has dominated discussions of the nation as a cultural force. The linear equivalence of event and idea that historicism proposes, most commonly signifies a people, a nation, or a national culture as an empirical sociological category or a holistic cultural entity. However, the narrative and psychological force that nationness brings to bear on cultural production and political projection is the effect of the ambivalence of the ‘nation’ as a narrative strategy. As an apparatus of symbolic power, it produces a continual slippage of categories, like sexuality, class affiliation, territorial paranoia, or ‘cultural difference’ in the act of writing the nation. What is displayed in this displacement and repetition of terms is the nation as the measure of the liminality of cultural modernity.

Edward Said aspires to such secular interpretation in his concept of ‘wordliness’ where ‘sensuous particularity as well as historical contingency … exist at the same level of surface particularity as the textual object itself’ (my emphasis).8 Fredric Jameson invokes something similar in his notion of ‘situated consciousness’ or national allegory, where the telling of the individual story and the individual experience cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious telling of the collectivity itself.9 And Julia Kristeva speaks perhaps too hastily of the pleasure of exile—“How can one avoid sinking into the mire of common sense, if not by becoming a stranger to one’s own country, language, sex and identity?”—without realizing how fully the shadow of the nation falls on the condition of exile—which may partly explain her own later, labile identifications with the images of other nations: ‘China’, ‘America’. The entitlement of the nation is its metaphor: Amor Patriae, Fatherland, Pig Earth, Mother Tongue, Maitigi, Middlemarch, Midnight’s Children, One Hundred Years of Solitude, War and Peace, I Promised Spotti, Kannabagiri, Moby-Dick, The Magic Mountain, Things Fall Apart.

There must be a tribe of interpreters of such metaphors—the translators of the dissemination of texts and discourses across cultures—who can perform what Said describes as the act of secular interpretation.

To take account of this horizontal, secular space of the crowded spectacle of the modern nation … implies that no single explanation sending one back immediately to a single origin is adequate. And just as there are no simple dynamic answers, there are no simple discrete formations or social processes.”

If, in our travelling theory, we are alive to the metaphoricity of the peoples of imagined communities—migrant or metropolitan—then we shall find that the space of the modern nation—people is never simply horizontal. Their metaphoric movement requires a kind of ‘doulousness’ in writing; a temporality of representation that moves between cultural formations and social processes without a centred causal logic. And such cultural movements disperse the homogeneous, visual time of the horizontal society. The secular language of interpretation needs to go beyond the horizontal critical gaze if we are to give ‘the nonsequential energy of lived historical memory and subjectivity’ its appropriate narrative authority. We need another time of writing that will be able to inscribe the ambivalent and chiasmatic intersections of time and place that constitute the problematic ‘modern’ experience of the Western nation.

How does one write the nation’s modernity as the event of the everyday and the advent of the epochal? The language of national belonging comes laden with apocalyptic apologetics, which has led Benedict Anderson to ask: ‘But why do nations celebrate their horribleness, not their astonishing youth?’10 The nation’s claim to modernity, as an autonomous or sovereign form of political rationality, is particularly questionable if, with Partha Chatterjee, we adopt the postcolonial perspective:

Nationalism … seeks to represent itself in the image of the Enlightenment and fails to do so. For Enlightenment itself, to assert its sovereignty as the universal ideal, needs its Other; if it could ever actualise itself in the real world as the truly universal, it would in fact destroy itself.”

Such ideological ambivalence nicely supports Ernest Gellner’s paradoxical point that the historical necessity of the nation conflicts with the contingent and arbitrary signs and symbols that signify the affective life of the national culture. The nation may exemplify modern social cohesion but

Nationalism is not what it seems, and above all not what it seems to itself…. The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions. Any old shroud would have served as well. But in no way does it follow that the principle of nationalism… is itself in the least contingent and accidental.” (My emphasis)

The problematic boundaries of modernity are enacted in these ambivalent temporalities of the nation-space. The language of culture and community is poised on the fissures of the present becoming the rhetorical figures of a national past. Historians transfixed on the event and origins of the nation never ask, and political theorists possessed of the ‘modern’ totalities of the nation—‘homogeneity, literacy and anonymity are the key traits’11—never pose, the essential question of the representation of the nation as a temporal process.

It is indeed only in the disjunctive time of the nation’s modernity—as a knowledge caught between political rationality and its impasse, between the shreds and patches of cultural signification and the certainties of a nationalist pedagogy—that questions of nation as narration come to be posed. How do we plot the narrative of the nation that must mediate between the teleology of progress tipping over into the ‘timeless’ discourse of irrationality? How do we understand that ‘homogeneity’ of modernity—the people—which, if pushed too far, may assume something resembling the archaic body of the despotic or totalitarian mass? In the midst of progress and modernity, the language of ambivalence reveals a politics ‘without duration’, as Althusser once provocatively wrote: ‘Space without places, time without duration.” To write the story of the nation demands that we articulate that archaic ambivalence that informs the time of modernity. We may begin by questioning that progressive metaphor of modern social cohesion—the many as one—shared by organic theories of the holism of culture and community, and by theorists who treat gender, class or race as social totalities that are expressive of unitary collective experiences.

Out of many one nowhere has this founding dictum of the political society of the modern nation—its spatial expression of a unitary people—found a more intriguing
image of itself than in those diverse languages of literary criticism that seek to portray the great power of the idea of the nation in the discourses of its everyday life, in the telling details that emerge as metaphors for national life. I am reminded of Bakhtin’s wonderful description of a national vision of emergence in Goethe’s Italien Journey, which represents the triumph of the Realistic component over the Romantic. Goethe’s realist narrative produces a national-historical time that makes visible a specifically Italian day in the detail of its passing time: ‘The bells ring, the rosary is said, the maid enters the room with a lighted lamp and says: Felicissima notte... If one were to force a German clockwork on them, they would be at a loss.’ For Bakhtin, it is Goethe’s vision of the microscopic, elementary, perhaps random, telling of everyday life in Italy that reveals the profound history of its locality (Lokalität), the spatialization of historical time, a creative humanization of this locality, which transforms a part of terrestrial space into a place of historical life for people.

The recurrent metaphor of landscape as the inscape of national identity emphasizes the quality of light, the question of social visibility, the power of the eye to naturalize the rhetoric of national affiliation and its forms of collective expression. There is, however, always the distracting presence of another temporality that disturbs the contemporaneity of the national present, as we saw in the national discourses with which I began. Despite Bakhtin’s emphasis on the realist vision in the emergence of the nation in Goethe’s work, he acknowledges that the origin of the nation’s visual presence is the effect of a narrative struggle. From the beginning, Bakhtin writes, the Realist and Romantic conceptions of time coexist in Goethe’s work, but the ghostly (Gespentertermässigkeit), the terrifying (Unerträglichkeit), and the unaccountable (Unzumutbarkeit) are consistently surmounted by the structuring process of the visualization of time: ‘the necessity of the past and the necessity of its place in a line of continuous development... finally the aspect of the past being linked to the necessary future.’ National time becomes concrete and visible in the chronotype of the local, particular, graphic, from beginning to end. The narrative structure of this historical surmounting of the ‘ghostly’ or the ‘double’ is seen in the intensification of narrative synchrony as a graphically visible position in space: ‘to grasp the most elusive course of pure historical time and fix it through unmediated contemplation.’ But what kind of ‘present’ is this if it is a consistent process of surmounting the ghostly time of repetition? Can this national time-space be as fixed or as immediately visible as Bakhtin claims?

If in Bakhtin’s ‘surmounting’ we hear the echo of another use of that word by Freud in his essay on ‘The uncanny’, then we begin to get a sense of the complex time of the national narrative. Freud associates surmounting with the repressions of a ‘cultural’ unconscious; a liminal, uncertain state of cultural belief when the archaic emerges in the midst of margins of modernity as a result of some psychic ambivalence or intellectual uncertainty. The ‘double’ is the figure most frequently associated with this uncanny process of ‘the doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self’. Such ‘double-time’ cannot be so simply represented as visible or flexible in ‘unmediated contemplation’; nor can we accept Bakhtin’s repeated attempt to read the national space as achieved only in the fullness of time. Such an apprehension of the ‘double and split’ time of national representation, as I am proposing, leads us to question the homogeneous and horizontal view associated with the nation’s imagined community. We are led to ask whether the emergence of a national perspective – of an elite or subaltern nature – within a culture of social contestation, can ever articulate its ‘representative’ authority in that fullness of narrative time and visual synchrony of the sign that Bakhtin proposes.

Two accounts of the emergence of national narratives seem to support my suggestion. They represent the diametrically opposed world views of master and slave which, between them, account for the major historical and philosophical dialectic of modern times. I am thinking of John Barrell’s splendid analysis of the rhetorical and perspectival status of the ‘English gentleman’ within the social diversity of the eighteenth-century novel; and of Houston Baker’s innovative reading of the ‘new national’ modes of sounding, interpreting and speaking the Negro in the Harlem Renaissance.

In his concluding essay Barrell demonstrates how the demand for a holistic, representative vision of society could only be represented in a discourse that was at the same time obsessively fixed upon, and uncertain of, the boundaries of society, and the margins of the text. For instance, the hypostatized ‘common language’ which was the language of the gentleman whether he be Observer, Spectator, Rambler, ‘Common to all by virtue of the fact that it manifested the peculiarities of none’ – was primarily defined through a process of negation – of regionalism, occupation, faculty – so that this centred vision of the ‘gentleman’ is so to speak ‘a condition of empty potential, one who is imagined as being able to comprehend everything, and yet who may give no evidence of having comprehended anything.

A different note of liminality is struck in Baker’s description of the ‘radical maroonage’ that structured the emergence of an insurgent Afro-American expressive culture in its expansive, ‘national’ phase. Baker’s sense that the ‘discursive project’ of the Harlem Renaissance is modernist is based less on a strictly literary understanding of the term, and more on the agonistic enunciative conditions within which the Harlem Renaissance shaped its cultural practice. The transgressive, invasive structure of the black ‘national’ text, which thrives on rhetorical strategies of hybridity, deformation, masking, and inversion, is developed through an extended analogy with the guerrilla warfare that became a way of life for the maroon communities of runaway slaves and fugitives who lived dangerously and insubordinately, on the frontiers or margins of all American promise, profit and modes of production. From this liminal, minority position where, as Foucault would say, the relations of discourse are of the nature of warfare, the force of the people of an Afro-American nation emerges in the extended metaphor of maroonage. For ‘warriors’ read writers or even ‘signers’.

these highly adaptable and mobile warriors took maximum advantage of local environments, striking and withdrawing with great rapidity, making extensive use of ambushes to catch their adversaries in cross-fire, fighting only when and where they chose, depending on reliable intelligence networks among non-maronos (both slave and white settlers) and often communicating by horns.

Both gentleman and slave, with different cultural means and to very different historical ends, demonstrate that forces of social authority and subversion or subalternity may emerge in displaced, even decentered strategies of signification. This does not prevent these positions from being effective in a political sense, although it does suggest
that positions of authority may themselves be part of a process of ambivalent identification. Indeed, the exercise of power may be both politically effective and psychically effective because the discursive liminality through which it is signified may provide greater scope for strategic manoeuvre and negotiation.

It is precisely in reading between these borderlines of the nation-space that we can see how the concept of the ‘people’ emerges within a range of discourses as a double narrative movement. The people are not simply historical events or parts of a patriotic body politic. They are also a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference: their claim to be representative provokes a crisis within the process of signification and discursive address. We then have a contested conceptual territory where the nation’s people must be thought in double-time: the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalistic pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or pre-enacted historical origin in the past; the people are also the ‘subjects’ of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity: as that sign of the present through which national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive process.

The scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a coherent national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle of national subjects. In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the continuous, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of writing the nation.

The Space of the People

The tension between the pedagogical and the performative that I have identified in the narrative address of the nation, turns the reference to a ‘people’ – from whatever political or cultural position it is made – into a problem of knowledge that haunts the symbolic formation of modern social authority. The people are neither the beginning nor the end of the national narrative; they represent the cutting edge between the totalizing powers of the ‘social’ as homogenous, consensual community, and the forces that signify the more specific address to contentious, unequal interests and identities within the population. The ambivalent signifying system of the nation-space participates in a more general genesis of ideology in modern societies that Claude Lefort has described. For him too it is ‘enigma of language’, at once internal and external to the speaking subject, that provides the most apt analogue for imagining the structure of ambivalence that constitutes modern social authority. I shall quote him at length, because his rich ability to represent the ‘movement of political power beyond the binary division of the blindness of ideology or the insight of the Idea, brings him to that liminal site of modern society from which I have attempted to derive the narrative of the nation and its people.

In ideology the representation of the rule is split from the effective operation of it... The rule is thus extracted from experience of language; it is circumscribed, made fully visible and assumed to govern the conditions of possibility of this experience... The signs of language – namely that it is both internal and external to the speaking subject, that there is an articulation of the self with others which marks the emergence of the self and in which the self does not control – is concealed by the representation of a space ‘outside’ – language from which it could be generated... We encounter the ambiguity of the representation as soon as the rule is stated; for its very exhibition undermines the power that the rule claims to introduce into practice. This exorbitant power must, in fact, be shown, and at the same time it must owe nothing to the movement which makes it appear... To be true to its image, the rule must be abstracted from any question concerning its origin, thus it goes beyond the operations that it controls... Only the authority of the master allows the contradiction to be concealed, but he is himself an object of representation; presented as possessor of the knowledge of the rule, he allows the contradiction to appear through himself.

The ideological discourse that we are examining has no safety catch; it is rendered vulnerable by its attempt to make visible the place from which the social relation would be conceivable (both thinkable and createable) by its inability to define this place without letting its contingency appear, without condemning itself to slide from one position to another, without hereby making apparent the instability of an order that it is intended to raise to the status of essence.... [The ideological] task of the implicit generalization of knowledge and the implicit homogenization of experience could fall apart in the face of the unbearable ordeal of the collapse of certainty, of the vacillation of representations of discourse and as a result of the splitting of the subject.

How do we conceive of the ‘splitting’ of the national subject? How do we articulate cultural differences within this vacillation of ideology in which the national discourse also participates, sliding ambivalently from one excrementary position to another? What are the forms of life struggling to be represented in that unruly ‘time’ of national culture, which Bakhtin surmounts in his reading of Goethe, Gellner associates with the rags and patches of everyday life, Said describes as the non-sequential energy of lived historical memory and subjectivity? and Lefort re-presents as the inexorable movement of signification that both constitutes the exorbitant image of power and deprives it of the certainty and stability of centre or closure? What might be the cultural and political effects of the liminality of the nation, the margins of modernity, which come to be signified in the narrative temporaliy of splitting, ambivalence and vacillation?

Deprived of that unmediated visibility of historicism – ‘looking to the legitimacy of past generations as supplying cultural autonomy’ – the nation turns from being the symbol of modernity into becoming the symptom of an ethnography of the ‘contemporary’ within modern culture. Such a shift in perspective emerges from an acknowledge- ment of the nation’s interrupted address articulated in the tension between signifying the people as an a priori historical presence, a pedagogical object, and the people constructed in the performance of narrative, its excrementary ‘present’ marked in the repetition and pulsation of the national sign. The pedagogical founds its narrative authority in a tradition of the people, described by Poultanzis as a moment of becoming designated by itself, encapsulated in a succession of historical moments that represents an eternity produced by self-generation. The performative intervenes in the sovereignty of the nation’s self-generation by casting a shadow between the people as
'image' and its signification as a differentiating sign of Self, distinct from the Other of the Outside.

In place of the polarity of a prefigurative self-generating nation 'in-itself' and extrinsic other nations, the performative introduces a temporality of the 'in-between'. The boundary that marks the nation's selfhood interrupts the self-generating time of national production and disrupts the signification of the people as homogeneous. The problem is not simply the 'selfhood' of the nation as opposed to the otherness of other nations. We are confronted with the nation split within itself, articulating the heterogeneity of its population. The barred Nation /Self, alienated from its eternal self-generation, becomes a liminal signifying space that is internally marked by the discourses of minorities, the heterogenous histories of contending peoples, antagonistic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference.

This double-writing or dissemi-nation, is not simply a theoretical exercise in the internal contradictions of the modern liberal nation. The structure of cultural liminality within the nation would be an essential precondition for deploying a concept such as Raymond Williams's crucial distinction between residual and emergent practices in oppositional cultures which require, he insists, a 'non-metaphysical, non-subjectivist' mode of explanation. The space of cultural signification that I have attempted to open up through the intervention of the performative, would meet this important precondition. The liminal figure of the nation-space would ensure that no political ideologies could claim transcendent or metaphysical authority for themselves. This is because the subject of cultural discourse – the agency of a people – is split in the discursive ambivalence that emerges in the contest of narrative authority between the pedagogical and the performative. This disjunctive temporality of the nation would provide the appropriate time-frame for representing those residual and emergent meanings and practices that Williams locates in the margins of the contemporary experience of society. Their emergence depends upon a kind of social eclipse; their transformational power depends upon their being historically displaced.

But in certain areas, there will be in certain periods, practices and meanings which are not reached for. There will be areas of practice and meaning which, almost by definition from its own limited character, or in its profound deformation, the dominant culture is unable in any real terms to recognize.26

When Edward Said suggests that the question of the nation should be put on the contemporary critical agenda as a hermeneutic of 'worldliness', he is fully aware that such a demand can only now be made from the liminal and ambivalent boundaries that articulate the signs of national culture, as 'zones of control or of abandonment, or recollection and of forgetting, of force or of dependence, of exclusiveness or of sharing' (my emphasis).27

Counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries – both actual and conceptual – disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which 'imagined communities' are given essentialist identities. For the political unity of the nation consists in a continual displacement of the anxiety of its irreducibly plural modern space – representing the nation's modern territoriality is turned into the archaic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism. The difference of space returns as the Sameness of time, turning Territory into Tradition, turning the People into One. The liminal point of this ideological displacement is the turning of the differentiated spatial boundary, the 'outside', into the authenticating 'inward' time of Tradition. Freud's concept of the 'narcissism of minor differences'29 – reinterpreted for our purposes – provides a way of understanding how easily the boundary that secures the cohesive limits of the Western nation may imperceptibly turn into a contentious internal liminality providing a place from which to speak both of, and as, the minority, the exotic, the marginal and the emergent.

Freud uses the analogy of seas that prevail between communities with adjoining territories – the Spanish and the Portuguese, for instance – to illustrate the ambivalent identification of love and hate that binds a community together: 'it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness.'30 The problem is, of course, that the ambivalent identifications of love and hate occupy the same psychic space; and paranoid projections 'outwards' return to haunt and split the place from which they are made. So long as a firm boundary is maintained between the territories, and the narcissistic wound is contained, the aggressivity will be projected on to the Other or the Outside. But what if, as I have argued, the people are the articulation of a doubling of the national address, an ambivalent movement between the discourses of pedagogy and the performative? What if, as Lefort argues, the subject of modern ideology is split between the iconic image of authority and the movement of the signifier that produces the image, so that the 'sign' of the social is condemned to slide ceaselessly from one position to another? It is in this space of liminality, in the 'unbearable ordeal of the collapse of certainty' that we encounter once again the narcissistic neuroses of the national discourse with which I began. The nation is no longer the sign of modernity under which cultural differences are homogenised in the 'horizontal' view of society. The nation reveals, in its ambivalent and vacillating representation, an ethnicity of its own claim to being the norm of social contemporaneity.

The people turn pages in that disseminatory act of social narrative that Lyotard defines, against the Platonic tradition, as the privileged pole of the narrated:

where the one doing the speaking speaks from the place of the referent. As narrator she is narrated as well. And in a way she is already told, and what she herself is telling will not undo that somewhere else she is told.31 (My emphasis)

This narrative inversion or circulation – which is in the spirit of my splitting of the people – makes untenable any supremacist, or nationalist claims to cultural mastery, for the position of narrative control is neither monocural nor monologic. The subject is graspable only in the passage between telling/old, between 'here' and 'somewhere else', and in this double scene the very condition of cultural knowledge is the alienation of the subject.

The significance of this narrative splitting of the subject of identification is borne out in Lévi-Strauss's description of the ethnographic act.32 The ethnographic demands that the observer himself is part of his observation and this requires that the field of knowledge – the total social fact – must be appropriated from the outside like a thing, but like a thing which comprises within itself the subjective understanding of the indigenous. The transposition of this process into the language of the outsider's grasp
totality. From this point of view we can understand why modern political rationality is permitted by the anomy between law and order. 

From Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* we have learned that the most individuated are those subjects who are placed on the margins of the social, so that the tension between law and order may produce the disciplinary or pastoral society. Having placed the people on the limits of the nation’s narrative, I now want to explore forms of cultural identity and political solidarity that emerge from the disjunctive temporality of the national culture. This is a lesson of history to be learnt from those peoples whose histories of marginality have been most profoundly enmeshed in the antinomies of law and order – the colonized and women.

Of Margins and Minorities

The difficulty of writing the history of the people as the insurmountable agonism of the living, the incomensurable experiences of struggle and survival in the construction of a national culture, is nowhere better seen than in Frantz Fanon’s essay ‘On national culture.’ I start with it because it is a warning against the intellectual appropriation of the ‘culture of the people’ (whatever that may be) within a representationalist discourse that may become fixed and reified in the annals of history. Fanon writes against that form of nationalist historicism that assumes that there is a moment when the differential temporalities of cultural histories coalesce in an immediately readable present. For my purposes, he focuses on the time of cultural representation, instead of immediately historicizing the event. He explores the space of the nation without immediately identifying it with the historical institution of the State. As my concern here is not with the history of nationalist movements, but only with certain traditions of writing that have attempted to construct narratives of the social imaginary of the nation–people, I am indebted to Fanon for liberating a certain, uncertain time of the people.

The knowledge of the people depends on the discovery, Fanon says, ‘of a much more formal nature which itself is continually being renewed’, a structure of repetition that is not visible in the translucidity of the people’s customs or the obvious objectivities which seem to characterize the people. Culture abhors simplification,’ Fanon writes, as he tries to locate the people in a performative time: ‘the fluctuating movement that the people are just giving shape to’. The present of the people’s history, then, is a practice that destroys the constant principles of the national culture that attempt to hark back to a “true” national past, which is often represented in the reified forms of realism and stereotype. Such pedagogical knowledges and continuist national narratives miss the ‘zone of occult instability where the people dwell’ (Fanon’s phrase). It is from this *instability* of cultural signification that the national culture comes to be articulated as a dialectic of various temporalities – modern, colonial, postcolonial, ‘native’ – that cannot be a knowledge that is stabilized in its enunciation: it is always contemporaneous with the act of recitation. It is the present act that on each of its occurrences marshalls in the ephemeral temporality inhabiting the space between the “I have heard” and “you will hear”.

Fanon’s critique of the fixed and stable forms of the nationalist narrative makes it imperative to question theories of the horizontal, homogeneous empty time of the
nation's narrative. Does the language of culture's 'occult instability' have a relevance outside the situation of anti-colonial struggle? Does the incommensurable act of living – so often dismissed as ethical or empirical – have its own ambivalent narrative, its own history of theory? Can it change the way we identify the symbolic structure of the Western nation? A similar exploration of political time has a salutary feminist history in 'Women's time.' It has rarely been acknowledged that Kristera's celebrated essay of that title has its conjunctural, cultural history, not simply in psychoanalysis and semiotics, but in a powerful critique and redefinition of the nation as a space for the emergence of feminist political and psychic identifications. The nation as a symbolic denominator is, according to Kristeva, a powerful repository of cultural knowledge that erases the rationalist and progressivist logics of the 'canonical' nation. This symbolic history of the national culture is inscribed in the strange temporality of the future perfect, the effects of which are not dissimilar to Fanon's occult instability.

The borders of the nation Kristera claims, are constantly faced with a double temporality: the process of identity constituted by historical sedimentation (the pedagogical); and the loss of identity in the signifying process of cultural identification (the performatve). The time and space of Kristeva's construction of the nation's finitude is analogous to my argument that the figure of the people emerges in the narrative ambivalence of disjunctive times and meanings. The concurrent circulation of linear, cursive and monumental time, in the same cultural space, constitutes a new historical temporality that Kristera identifies with psychoanalytically informed, feminist strategies of political identification. What is remarkable is her insistence that the gendered sign can hold together such exiguous historical times.

The political effects of Kristera's multiple women's time leads to what she calls the 'dissociation of identity'. The cultural moment of Fanon's 'occult instability' signifies the people in a fluctuating movement which they are just given shape to, so that postcolonial time questions the teleological traditions of past and present, and the polarized historicist sensibility of the archaic and the modern. These are not simply attempts to invert the balance of power within an unchallenged order of discourse. Fanon and Kristeva seek to redefine the symbolic process through which the social imaginary – nation, culture or community – becomes the subject of discourse, and the object of psychic identification. These feminist and postcolonial temporalities force us to rethink the sign of history within those languages, political or literary, which designate the people 'as one'. They challenge us to think the question of community and communication without the moment of transcendence: how do we understand such forms of social contradiction?

Cultural identification is then poised on the brink of what Kristeva calls the 'loss of identity' or Fanon describes as a profound cultural 'undecidability'. The people as a form of address emerge from the abyss of enunciation where the subject splits, the signifier 'fades', the pedagogical and the performative are agonistically articulated. The language of national collectivity and cohesiveness is now at stake. Neither can cultural homogeneity, or the nation's horizontal space be authoritatively represented within the familiar territory of the public sphere: social causality cannot be adequately understood as a deterministic or overdetermined effect of a 'statist' centre, nor can the rationality of political choice be divided between the polar realms of the private and the public. The narrative of national cohesion can no longer be signified, in Anderson's words, as a 'sociological solidarity', fixed in a 'succession of plural' – hospitals, prisons, remote villages – where the social space is clearly bounded by such repeated objects that represent a naturalistic, national horizon.

Such a pluralism of the national sign, where difference returns as the same, is contested by the signifier's 'loss of identity' that inscribes the narrative of the people in the ambivalent, 'double' writing of the performative and the pedagogical. The movement of meaning between the masterful image of the people and the movement of its sign interrupts the succession of plurals that produce the sociological solidarity of the national narrative. The nation's totality is confronted with, and crossed by, a supplementary movement of writing. The heterogeneous structure of Derridean supplementarity in writing closely follows the agonistic, ambivalent movement between the performative and pedagogical and performatively that forms the nation's narrative address. A supplement, according to one meaning, 'accumulates and accumulates presence. It is thus that arte, techno, image, representation, convention, etc. come as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire cumulative function' (pedagogical). The double entendre of the supplement suggests, however, that

[It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of... If it represents and makes an image it is by the anterior default of a presence... the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern instance... As substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no relief... Somewhere, something can be filled up of itself... only by allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy. (performative)]

It is in this supplementary space of doubling – not plurality – where the image is presence and proxy, where the sign supplements and empties nature, that the disjunctive times of Fanon and Kristera can be turned into the discourses of emergent cultural identities, within a non-pluralistic politics of difference.

This supplementary space of cultural signification that opens up – and holds together – the performative and the pedagogical, provides a narrative structure characteristic of modern political rationality: the marginal integration of individuals in a repetitious movement between the antinomies of law and order. From the liminal movement of the culture of the nation – at once opened up and held together – minority discourse emerges. Its strategy of intervention is similar to what British parliamentary procedure recognizes as a supplementary question. It is a question that is supplementary to what is stated on the 'order paper' for the minister's response. Coming 'after' the original, or in 'addition to' it, gives the supplementary question the advantage of introducing a sense of 'secondariness' or belatedness into the structure of the original demand. The supplementary strategy suggests that adding 'to' need not 'add up' but may disturb the calculation. As Gasché has succinctly suggested, 'supplements... are pluses that compensate for a minus in the origin'. The supplementary strategy interrupts the successive seriality of the narrative of plurals and pluralism by radically changing their mode of articulation. In the metaphor of the national community as the 'many as one', the one is now both the tendency to totalize the social in a homogeneous empty time, and the repetition of that minus in the origin, the less-than-one that intervenes with a metonymic, iterative temporality.
One cultural effect of such a metonymic interruption in the representation of the people, is apparent in Julia Kristeva's political writings. If we elide her concepts of women's time and female exile, then she seems to argue that the 'singularity' of woman — her representation as fragmentation and drive — produces a disassociation, and a distanciation, by the symbolic bond itself which demystifies the 'community' of language as a universal and unifying tool, one which totalizes and equalizes. The minority does not simply confront the pedagogical or powerful master-discourse with a contradictory or negating referent. It interrogates its object by initially withholding its objective. Insinuating itself into the terms of reference of the dominant discourse, the supplementary antagonizes the implicit power to generalize, to produce the sociological solidity. The questioning of the supplement is not a repetitive rhetoric of the 'end' of society but a meditation on the disposition of space and time from which the narrative of the nation must begin. The power of supplementaryarity is not the negation of the preconstituted social contradictions of the past or present; its force lies — as we shall see in the discussion of Handsworth Songs that follows — in the renegotiation of those times, terms and traditions through which we turn our uncertain, passing contemporaneity into the signs of history.

Handsworth Songs is a film made by the Black Audio and Film Collective during the uprisings of 1985, in the Handsworth district of Birmingham, England. Shot in the midst of the uprising, it is haunted by two moments: the arrival of the migrant population in the 1950s, and the emergence of a black British people in the diaspora. And the film itself is part of the emergence of a black British cultural politics. Between the moments of the migrants' arrival and the minorities' emergence spins the filmic time of a continual displacement of narrative. It is the time of oppression and resistance, the time of the performance of the riots, cut across by the pedagogical knowledge of State institutions. The racism of statistics and documents and newspapers is interrupted by the perplexed living of Handsworth songs.

Two memories repeat incessantly to translate the living perplexity of history into the time of migration: first, the arrival of the ship laden with immigrants from the ex-colonies, just stepping off the boat, always just emerging — as in the fantastic scenario of Freud's family romance — into the land where the streets are paved with gold. This is followed by another image of the perplexity and power of an emergent peoples, caught in the shot of a dreadlocked rastafarian cutting a swathe through a posse of policemen during the uprising. It is a memory that flashes incessantly through the film: a dangerous repetition in the present of the cinematic frame, the edge of human life that translates what will come next and what has gone before in the writing of History. Listen to the repetition of the time and space of the peoples that I have been trying to create:

In time we will demand the impossible in order to wrestle from it that which is possible, In time the streets will claim me without apology, In time I will be right to say that there are no stories... in the riots only the ghosts of other stories.

The symbolic demand of cultural difference constitutes a history in the midst of the uprising. From the desire of the possible in the impossible, in the historic present of the riots, emerge the ghostly repetitions of other stories, the record of other uprisings of people of colour: Broadwater Farm, Southall, St Paul's, Bristol. In the ghostly repetition of the black woman of Loxells Rd, Handsworth, who sees the future in the past. There are no stories in the riots, only the ghosts of other stories, she told a local journalist: 'You can see Enoch Powell in 1969, Michael X in 1965.' And from the gathering repetition she builds a history.

From across the film listen to another woman who speaks another historical language. From the archaic world of metaphor, caught in the movement of the people she translates the time of change into the ebb and flow of language's unmastering rhythm: the successive time of instantaneity, battering against the straight horizons, and then the flow of water and words:

I walk with my back to the sea, horizons straight ahead
Wave the sea way and back it comes,
Step and I sip on it.
Crawling in my journey's footsteps
When I stand it fills my bones.

The perplexity of the living must not be understood as some existential, ethical anguish of the empiricism of everyday life in 'the eternal living present', that gives liberal discourse a rich social reference in moral and cultural relativism. Nor must it be too hastily associated with the spontaneous and primordial presence of the people in the liberatory discourses of populist recruitment. In the construction of this discourse of 'living perplexity' that I am attempting to produce we must remember that the space of human life is pushed to its incommensurable extreme; the judgement of living is perplexed, the topos of the narrative is neither the transcendent, pedagogical idea of History nor the institution of the State, but a strange temporality of the repetition of the one in the other — an oscillating movement in the governing present of cultural authority.

Minority discourse sets the act of emergence in the antagonistic in-between of image and sign, the accumulative and the adjacent, presence and proxy. It contests genealogies of 'origin' that lead to claims for cultural supremacy and historical priority. Minority discourse acknowledges the status of national culture — and the people — as a contentious, performative space of the perplexity of the living in the midst of the pedagogical representations of the fullness of life. Now there is no reason to believe that such marks of difference cannot inscribe a 'history' of the people or become the gathering points of political solidarity. They will not, however, celebrate the monumentality of historian memory, the sociological totality of society, or the homogeneity of cultural experience. The discourse of the minority reveals the insurmountable ambivalence that structures the equivocal movement of historical time. How does one encounter the past as an anteriority that continually introduces an otherness or alterity into the present? How does one then narrate the present as a form of contemporaneity that is neither punctual nor synchronous? In what historical time do such configurations of cultural difference assume forms of cultural and political authority?

NOTES

5 F. Jameson, ‘Third World literature in the era of multinational capitalism’, *Social Text* (Fall 1986), p. 69 and *pazizm*.
11 Ibid., p. 38.
14 Ibid., p. 34.
15 Ibid., p. 36 and *pazizm*.
16 Ibid., pp. 47–9.
20 Barrell, *English Literature*, p. 78.
21 Ibid., p. 203.
27 R. Williams, *Problems in Materialism and Culture* (London: Verso, 1980), p. 43. I must thank Prof. David Lloyd of the University of California, Berkeley, for reminding me of Williams’s important concept.
30 Ibid.