Yay law!<\/p>\n
The gist of this case is a fairly simple, albeit broad, allegation that the NCAA and Power Conferences operate as a price-fixing cartel. This would mean that the defendants would be in violation of the Sherman Act and liable for breaking federal antitrust laws that prohibit price-fixing and anti-competitive practices. The plaintiffs in the case are Division I football and basketball players who received full athletic scholarships to NCAA universities, as well as two classes of football and basketball players who are in comparable situations. Plaintiffs assert that defendants engaged in anti-competitive behavior by setting caps on the amount of compensation an athlete could receive for his services (full grant in aid) and took part in conspiracy, as there was not another reasonable forum where these athletes could provide said services for compensation. The defendants then make billions of dollars from the performances and related activities of the plaintiffs.<\/p>\n
I see a ton of stories from this case, many of which have been explored by journalists in the past. One point particularly strikes me, though. The plaintiffs claim that NCAA price-fixing eliminates competitive behavior because schools cannot offer more than full grants in aid to their athletes, but these practices have not worked because certain conferences (SEC) still dominate in championship events. So I think a story might be getting the schools’ perspective. Do they want to eliminate NCAA regulations and have the freedom to offer recruits large sums of money to play? What about lesser-known Division I schools that may not have the prestige in football or basketball?<\/p>\n
I also think it would be interesting to hear the Ivy League’s take on this whole controversy. What do its member schools use to recruit athletes when they are not able to offer athletic scholarships? How do NCAA regulations indirectly affect their programs?<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"